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Providing decent housing for our nation's urban
dwellers remains one of the greatest problems our
cities face. After decades of innumerable programs
aimed at improving housing conditions, the
problems not only persist, but have grown worse.
With our cities increasingly occupied by the poor,
the aged, and others with little mobility or living
choice, the provision of decent housing is no longer
viewed merely as a challenge to our ingenuity and
humanity, but more as acomplex problem integrally
related to the ultimate survival of cities themselves.
During the last decade, in particular, we have
witnessed the loss of hundreds of thousands of
structurally sound housing units as city neighbor-
hood after neighborhood has fallen prey to
deterioration and housing market breakdown. This
phenomenon has heightened significance since
older housing can only be replaced at today's
prohibitive building costs. Because of these eco-
nomic constraints, older units will have to play a
major role in filling the housing needs of our
country. The necessity of maintaining and preser-
ving this resource becomes critically important, and
inextricably related to the future quality of life in
urban America.
If cities are to remain decent places to live, an
atmosphere must be created that is conducive to
substantial amounts of reinvestment in older neigh-
borhoods. As used here, reinvestment refers to
provision of capital for housing rehabilitation
programs in deteriorated neighborhoods, and the
array of public services which must accompany any
successful rehabilitation effort. The trend of
planners to encourage such reinvestment has oc-
curred largely in the context of broader strategies
aimed at neighborhood preservation (HUD 1975).
According to Sternlieb, preservation is an all-
inclusive term that refers predominantly to the
rehabilitation of housing, but also includes demoli-
tion, reuse of space, some new construction, and a
series of socio-economic strategies (Greendale and
Knock 1976, p. 28). Neighborhood preservation
strategies have enjoyed their greatest successes in
the area of historic preservation. However, there is
an important difference between historic preserva-
tion efforts and other types of preservation, in that
historic preservation generates a middle- and
upper-class demand for housing in the target
neighborhood. The real battleground for saving our
inner-city housing stock will probably not be these
areas with historic significance, but the far more
numerous neighborhoods where there is little de-
mand for housing, no real incentives for investment,
and where preservation will benefit only those
people already living in the area.
The successes in the historic preservation field
should not cause one to overlook the tremendous
difficulties to be encountered in other types of
preservation activity. Part of the problem is that local
preservation programs directed at the most
debilitated housing stock are often developed in
reaction to federal funding requirements. In many
respects, this results in an acceptance from on-high
of the basic approach to housing problems, or at
least predisposes programs to certain attitudes and
assumptions. With afederal mind-set having already
been prescribed, local planning efforts are at times
lax in conducting independent and rigorous
assessments of housing problems responsive to
local market peculiarities. Specifically, planners
must spend more time understanding: 1) the nature
and causes of housing problems in particular target
neighborhoods; 2) the types of coordinative efforts
needed to conduct a housing reinvestment program;
and 3) the importance of realistic expectations in a
reinvestment strategy.
This article attempts to develop a strategy for
reinvestment that addresses the most serious of our
housing problems: the preservation and improve-
ment of dilapidated housing in neighborhoods with
little market attractiveness. By definition, the goals
and objectives of such a strategy must be far more
modest than with a historic preservation program.
To a large degree, housing in these blighted areas
will never be extremely desirable. At best, we can
hope that market conditions can be stabilized in
such a way as to provide safe and decent housing for
community residents. The primary goal of a
reinvestment strategy should be to create a
mechanism that will: 1) allow homeowners to bring
their properties up to code standards while main-
taining homeownership; and 2) encourage investor-
owners to eliminate substandard housing con-
ditions without substantially raising rents.
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Emphasis is placed on housing reinvestment
because "neighborhood revitalization depends
upon the existence of a viable housing market"
(Albrandt and Brophy 1975, p. 26). Although certain
aspects of a broader neighborhood preservation
strategy are not discussed, this does not mean that
they are not equally as important. Housing
rehabilitation programs can ultimately be success-
ful only if accompanied by city efforts to enhance
positive perception of neighborhoods. This can be
achieved through visible capital improvements, up-
grading service delivery, social and economic
development, and actively involving neighborhood
residents in the planning process.
Under these constraints, what types of programs,
policies, and regulations can be initiated at the local
level to improve housing in these deteriorated
areas? This article offers one solution through the
examination of housing problems in Durham, North
Carolina. Housing market conditions are discussed,
follov\/ed by a brief description of the city's efforts in
the housing reinvestment area, and a proposed
strategy for stimulating such reinvestment. Because
Durham is fairly typical of a medium-sized southern
city, this article should be of particular interest to
other planners working with housing problems in
the South. Although housing problems are national
"At best, we can hope that market
conditions can be stabilized in such a
way as to provide safe and decent
housing for community residents."
in scope, the unique local characteristics of the
Durham housing market (and presumably of
markets in other southern cities) cause the reinvest-
ment issue to be shaped much differently than has
traditionally been the case in larger northern cities.
To a certain degree, this is an indictment of federal
programs whose perception and approach to hous-
ing problems is often oriented to these larger
metropolitan housing markets. In any case, the
unique conditions in Durham afford the city an
opportunity to be more flexible in proposing
reinvestment strategies than is possible elsewhere.
Background on the Durham
Housing Market
Like many southern cities, Durham has serious
housing problems. Lester Salamon, in a recently
completed study of Durham's housing market,
found that 20% of the stock is in substandard
condition (Salamon 1976, p. vi). The supply of
vacant housing units is limited, with the problem
being particularly acute in the renter-occupied
stock. While 54% of all of the city's housing units are
renter-occupied, 75% of all of the substandard or
deteriorating stock is renter-occupied.
Housing found in Durham's Community Development Area
Photo by Pal Jenny
Salamon's study reveals, however, that the
characteristics of Durham's substandard housing
market are far from typical. Much of the substandard
housing in the city is relatively new, with 40% having
been built since 1939 (Salamon 1976, p. 2). Unlike
larger northern cities where tenement structures are
common, 96% of all of Durham's substandard units
are either single-family residences or duplexes
(Salamon 1976, p. 5). It is generally recognized that
these types of units can be rehabilitated with greater
flexibility than can larger structures (Stegman and
Sumka 1975, p. 25). The Durham Housing
Assistance Plan of 1975 estimated that 93% of all
substandard units were capable of being
rehabilitated. However, this figure probably
overstates the situation. Salamon found that "a
substantial share of Durham's housing stock was
built to below-code standards to begin with, raising
serious questions about the possibilities for
rehabilitation and upgrading"(Salamon 1976, p. 2).
Durham's substandard units are also dispersed
over a relatively wide geographic area. The ten
"substandard housing areas" identified by the City
Planning Department as having the largest concen-
trations of deteriorated units contain only 40% of all
of the city's substandard houses (Salamon 1976, p.
6). Within these substandard housing areas exists a
healthy mixture of both standard and substandard
housing. This contrasts sharply with larger cities
where there are often vast homogeneous sections of
substandard units. Durham might be able to take
advantage of this phenomenon by promoting hous-
ing rehabilitation in neighborhoods containing
significant amounts of standard units. This might
give neighborhood improvement efforts a greater
chance of success, since they would be conducted
in areas where elements of a more stable housing
market are already present.
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From the investor side, the Durham substandard
housing market is economically more viable than in
many larger cities. However, present indications of
market weakness have serious implications for the
future. Ownership of Durham's substandard rental
housing market is stratified, with a small group of
landlords in control of 50-60% of all of the units
(Salamon 1976, p. 9). Although the worst housing
tends to be owned by these larger concerns, 62% of
all landlords own five or fewer substandard rental
units (Salamon 1976, p. 8).
The typical owner of rental housing in Durham is
elderly, white, a long-time Durham resident, and an
amateur landlord having a non-real estate-related
occupation, who has entered the market in the last
two decades largely for investment purposes
(Salamon 1976, pp.1 1-13). Absentee ownership, a
common problem in larger cities where owners
either cannot be found or reside in a different state,
is not a major concern in Durham.
Unfortunately, investment opportunities in the
Durham substandard housing market are lacking.
Investor-owned properties usually have positive
cash flows, with investor-owners typically being
able to return about 772% on invested capital. In
Durham's substandard housing market, this figure
drops to a 472% return to present value (Salamon
1976, p. 32) (see Figure 1), which is as much as three
or four times less the return many new landlords
would expect in a successful real estate endeavor. It
is understandable why investor-owners are unwill-
ing to invest capital in these substandard properties
when they can get as large a return on their money
by placing it in the bank without any risk.
As might be expected, incomes of tenants in
substandard units are low. As Ahlbrandt and Brophy
noted in their book on neighborhood revitalization:
If incomes are low, landlords, in particular,
may not have an incentive for re-investment
because their existing clientele may not be
Figure 1
Cash Flow Statements for
Substandard Rental Housing
Units in Durham
Item 1974 1973
Receipts $695.00 $676.17
Management Fee $ 60.25 $ 60.00
Property Tax 85.25 85.87
Insurance 27.75 27.75
Misc.—Exterminator, etc. 30.00 18.00
Sub-total, Fixed Costs 203.25 191.12
Repairs 125.50 110.50
Sub-total Expenses -328.75
366.25
-301.62
Profit (Loss) 374.55
Profit Rate 52.7% 55.4%
Return on Invested Capital ($5,000) 7.3%
Return on Present Value ($8,500) 4.3%
Return on Assessed Value ($5,130) 7.1%
7.5%
4.4%
7.3%
able to pay additional rent to cover the cost
of the investment. Landlords will only be
motivated to upgrade their housing if they
can reasonably expect to rent to tenants at
higher levels and thereby recapture their
investment (1975, pp. 25-26).
Because of these unfavorable market conditions,
investor-owners often face a dilemma. They may
allow their properties to deteriorate slowly while not
raising rents, or invest heavily in a rehabilitation
effort while trying to raise rents substantially to
repay the rehabilitation loan. A "sit-tight" attitude
with respect to these properties is understandable
given tenant bitterness toward rent increases and
investor-owner pessimism concerning their ability
to repay a loan.
The positive cash flows in the substandard seg-
ment of Durham's market are due in part to the low
property taxes in the city (about 12.3% of gross
receipts, as compared to tax rates of 1 5-21 % in larger
cities) (Salamon 1976, p. 26). Low tenant turnover
(average length of tenancy being close to six years)
and low vandalism rates also contribute to the
positive returns, as well as to greater stability in the
market (Salamon 1976, p. 23).
Most significantly, substandard properties in
Durham have continued to appreciate in value
(although at a rate of only 3-4% a year), with resale
values around eight times the rent rolls (Salamon
1976, p. 32). This has very positive implications for a
housing rehabilitation strategy, and contrasts
sharply with segments of larger inner-city markets.
In Baltimore, substandard properties can be
purchased for as little as twice the rent roll (Stegman
and Sumka 1975, p. 211), and even massive
rehabilitation efforts have resulted in little or no
property value appreciation. Insurance and
mortgage money are also available to investor-
owners in Durham. According to Stegman and
Sumka, the availability of mortgage money is
generally a sensitive barometer to the future of the
housing market (1975, p. 187).
Unfortunately, current interest rates are such that
new purchasers of substandard units would have
great difficulty meeting financing charges with the
net rental incomes from their properties. Ownership
of many of these properties will be changing hands
,. I the not too distant future, with 40% of the investor-
owners over sixty-five years of age and another 46%
between forty and sixty years of age (Salamon 1976,
p. 12).
It can be presumed that there will be major
changes in this sector of the housing market, either
in terms of falling resale values, increased rents, or
decapitalizing or "milking" properties by securing
high profit yields through neglecting needed
maintenance.
Durham is currently involved in trying to
rehabilitate substandard housing in target neigh-
borhoods through its Community Development
(CD) Block Grant program. Out of atotal CD budget
of $2.3 million in 1975-76, the city designated over
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$800,000 for housing rehabilitation work (Goldberg
1977). Unfortunately, due to administrative dif-
ficulties, only a small amount of the allocated funds
were actually spent (Herman and Ellis 1977). Future
efforts aimed at rehabilitating Durham's substan-
dard housing stock should continue to focus on
community development target neighborhoods.
These areas, containing the largest concentrations
of low-income residents and substandard housing
units, are eligible to receive the vital federal
assistance so important in financing neighborhood
improvement efforts.
A Housing Reinvestment Strategy for the
Durham Community Development Area
Improving the condition of housing in the Durham
CD area will involve the implementation of a coor-
dinated series of policies and actions. The director
of a housing reinvestment program must continually
insure the maximum participation of community
residents, local officials, lending institution repre-
sentatives, and planners in every phase of the
reinvestment project. Neighborhoods die largely as
a result of being neglected. They are revived only
when a renewed spirit and collective sense of
commitment to the neighborhood are generated
among the major actors affecting the community's
viability.
The major problem in a reinvestment effort, after
financing arrangements have been made, is getting
the first few people to undertake the actual housing
rehabilitation work. Although the majority of home
and investor-owners might agree in principle to
undertake improvements, very few may want to risk
investing large amounts of capital in a deteriorated
neighborhood unless their investments are secured
by the firm assurance that the risks are going to be
shared by everyone in the community. Planners
must direct this "wait and see" attitude toward
reinvestment in a manner that will get everyone to
jump in at the same time. A housing reinvestment
program can be unsuccessful even if all of the
residents in a given community participate, but the
chances for a successful neighborhood improve-
ment effort should increase with the number of
residents actively involving themselves in a
program.
The use of a housing code enforcement program,
where it is made clear to owners that all properties in
a given area will have to be brought up to certain
minimum standards, has been the traditional way of
achieving this purpose. Unfortunately many of the
housing codes in North Carolina are relatively weak,
making it difficult for present CD efforts to make
substantial impacts on substandard housing con-
ditions. A 1974 study of Durham's housing code
concluded that it "is relatively ineffective in meeting
the overall problem of substandard housing" (LBC &
W Associates 1974, p. 25).
Currently limited CD mechanisms must be rein-
forced by a legal instrument with the power to make
substantial improvement in deteriorated neighbor-
hoods. Such power can be realistically derived
through the resurrection of state urban renewal
legislation (N.C. Gen. Stat. 160-500) if utilized in a
manner sensitive to citizen and community needs of
the 1970's. This power would include the right for the
director of the renewal effort to set whatever hous-
ing code standard is necessary to improve the
quality of housing in the target neighborhood in a
meaningful way.
The development of a strong housing code and
code enforcement program is an important first step
in a rehabilitation effort. It provides the standards by
which municipalities can require that housing be
maintained at adequate levels of health and safety
(Ahlbrandt and Brophy 1975, p. 38). Through urban
renewal powers, codes can also mandate that
housing units be rehabilitated and not merely
forestalled from further deterioration.
Not only must a new code be strong on paper, but
it must also be strong in its actual application.
Enforcement must be conducted in a quick, com-
prehensive, and consistent manner. An effective
code strategy should also include a citizen educa-
tion component. It is essential that citizens under-
stand and support the code program as a
mechanism to improve their neighborhoods.
As William Grigsby has pointed out, a code
enforcement program can only be effective if an
environment is created that is conducive to housing
maintenance and investment (Ahlbrandt and
Brophy 1975, p. 42). This serves to highlight the
need for programs that create financial incentives
for the rehabilitation of deteriorated housing.
"The major problem ... is getting
the first few people to undertake
rehabilitation work."
Rehabilitation Programs
A property is rehabilitated only when the owner
decides to rehabilitate it and is able to finance the
work (Gressel 1976). A homeowner's or investor-
owner's willingness to invest in a rehabilitation effort
depends on his perception of whether the invest-
ment makes rational economic sense and the con-
fidence that his effort, combined with similar in-
vestments, will successfully preserve and upgrade
the neighborhood. The realization of an effective
neighborhood revitalization effort is most depen-
dent on the provision of low-cost funds for
homeowners and investor-owners alike to finance
the actual rehabilitation work.
The section 312 federal rehabilitation loan
program, which provides a 3% loan to low-income
property owners, has been used in many southern
cities to finance such housing reinvestment efforts.
The national commitment to this program, however,
has been inconsistent (American Institute of
Planners 1976, p. 15). Funding has been erratic.
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preventing cities from maintaining the production
schedules essential to volume rehabilitation. Since
neighborhood revitalization is dependent on an
intense and uninterrupted effort in housing
rehabilitation over a period of several years, Durham
must seek an alternate source of funding.
The city could establish a viable alternative to the
federally mandated rehabilitation loan programs
through the cooperation of its Housing Authority,
CD office, and local lending institutions. It is only
then that a stop could be put to "on-again, off-again"
flow of federal dollars.
Such a locally conceived housing reinvestment
program might work in the following way. Using
local lending institutions as the primary source of
rehabilitation loan funds, the Housing Authority
would borrow money to implement the program. If
the Housing Authority was properly classified as a
tax-exempt governmental entity, banks could lend it
money at a reduced interest rate (around 50-60% of
the normal rate) because the income from the loan
would be tax-exempt (Furr 1977). The borrowed
money would then be lent to property owners with
the interest savings passed on to the borrowers.The
obligation of loan recipients would be further reduc-
ed by an interest subsidy provided with CD funds.
Loans would be tailored to meet the specific
rehabilitation needs of the property, as well as the
individual needs of the property owner. Credit
standards would have to be low enough to allow the
majority of CD property owners to participate in the
program. Resulting mortgages and a Loan Guaran-
tee Fund supplied from CD money would provide
the basic security for the loan.
Four categories of loan recipients would be
included in such a rehabilitation program. Home-
owners of substandard units would be divided into
Figure 2
Deferred Payment Loan Program
Supported by CD Funds Versus
Private Funds
Assumptions: CD funds are used to make the loan; the
amount of theloan is$5,000withtheloan being repaid
after 15 years.
$5,000
$0
$0
$5,000
amount of the loan
interest paid by homeowner
amount recaptured under grant program
amount recaptured
There exists a mixture of standard and poor quality housing.
Photo by Blair Pollock
Assumptions: Bank funds are used to make the loan; CD
funds are used to pay the interest. The loan is for
$5,000 with the loan being repaid after 15 years; the
interest rate charged on the loan is 5%, paid annually
by the CD Office.
$5,000 amount of the loan
$250 one year's interest on the loan paid by
the CD Office
$3,750 amount of interest paid by CD Office
over 15 year period
$2,427.50 present value of receiving yearly
payments of $250 for
15 years discounted at 6%
extremely low- and low-income groups. Similarly,
investor-owners would be classified into categories
of low-and non-low-income owners. Following is an
explanation of how the program would affect each
category of loan recipients.
Extremely Low-Income Homeowners
Extremely low-income homeowners in Durham
have little money to repay even a subsidized low-
interest loan, with many being elderly and on fixed
incomes. A reinvestment strategy aimed at up-
grading the quality of housing must allow extremely
low-income homeowners to perform needed
repairs, but also insure that they do not incur any
undue financial hardship. One way that a reinvest-
ment program can be tailored to meet these needs
involves the use of a deferred payment loan.
Employing such a deferred payment loan scheme,
loans up to $5,000, to be used only to bring the
property up to code standards, would be made
available to the homeowner. ($5,000 is a suggested
figure based on average rehabilitation costs in
Durham in 1975. This figure might understate the
current costs of reconstruction, due to increased
building costs, and may need to be readjusted.)
Recipients would make no monthly payments, but
instead would repay the loan in a lump sum or
"balloon payment" when they sold, vacated, or
transferred the property.
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Figure 3
The U^e of the Deferred Payment Loan
Assumptions: Values in Figure 3 are approximations and
not real estimations of actual cost. They are used to
illustrate how the program might work.
Current value of property
Amount of rehabilitation loan
Post-rehabilitation Value
•assumes that the property
value does not increase by
the amount of the re-
habilitation loan
Appreciation of rehabilitation
property at 3% for 15 years
Value of property 15 years
after rehabilitation
Payback of Loan
Cash Residual after
loan repayment
$ 8,000
$ 5,000
$11,000
$ 6,137.63
$17,137.63
-$5,000
$12,137.63
CD funds would be used directly to make these
deferred payment loans, or instead used to leverage
larger amounts of private capital w/hich in turn would
be made available for such loans. In the latter case,
CD funds would be used to subsidize the interest
payments due on the loans. Figure 2 explains the
cost difference to Durham between using public and
private funds in supporting a deferred payment loan
program.
As can be seen from Figure 2, using CD funds to
leverage private capital could substantially increase
a program's size, since private instead of public
funds would be used to make the actual loans.
However, potential credit difficulties encountered
with lending institutionsmightforcethedirectuseof
CD funds for these loans.
The idea behind the deferred payment loan
program is for a homeowner to rehabilitate his
property and enjoy the benefits of the work without
incurring any immediate expense. The rehabilitation
loan would be repaid at some future time when the
homeowner sold his property. The deferred pay-
ment loan program tries to take advantage of
appreciating real estate values in the substandard
housing sector in Durham. If a successful reinvest-
ment effort occurs in a community, real estate values
might be expected to rise initially, although
probably not enough to offset the principal of the
rehabilitation loan. If properties continue to ap-
preciate in value, the rehabilitation loans should be
able to be repaid from the increase in value to the
property in a few years' time. Figure 3 details how the
deferred payment loan program might improve the
position of the low-income homeowner.
As can be seen from Figure 3, it is assumed that
the infusion of rehabilitation funds will allow proper-
ties to continue to appreciate at their current rate of
3-4% a year. This should have the effect of more
than doubling the value of rehabilitated properties in
a fifteen year period, and should assuage creditor
and homeowner fears of the burden a deferred
payment loan might impose.
Elderly homeowners would particularly be able to
benefit from a deferred payment loan program. As
noted earlier, deferred loans would not have to be
repaid until the property is sold or transferred. For
many elderly homeowners this means that their
loans would probably come due upon the transfer of
the properties at the time of their deaths. This would
allow elderly homeowners to enjoy the present
benefits of the rehabilitation work, and to let their
estates bear the costs.
There are several advantages in using a deferred
payment loan instead of an outright grant. Most
importantly, it helps to insure that the owner does
not convert the grant into a cash profit. As pointed
"Loans would be tailored to meet the
specific rehabilitation needs of the
property as well as the individual
needs of the property owner."
out by Gressel (1976), "If the improvements financ-
ed with the grant increase the value of the property,
and the owner turns around and sells the property,
the grant will end up in his pocket." With a deferred
payment loan, the amount of the loan is recaptured
at the time of sale or transfer. This points to the
second advantage of using a deferred payment loan:
that the loan, unlike a grant, is eventually repaid and
can be used again for other neighborhood improve-
ment efforts. Additionally, loan programs in general
seem to arouse less political opposition than
programs employing outright grants. With the full
support of local government so crucial to the
success of a revitalization effort, this becomes an
important tactical consideration. Finally, participa-
tion in a loan program, by definition, gives a
homeowner a substantial stake in the outcome of the
rehabilitation effort. This type of strong commit-
ment, so vital to successful reinvestment, might not
be generated to the same degree in an outright grant
program.
The use of a deferred payment loan scheme does
have its disadvantages. Most importantly, loans
would probably have a fifteen year maximum term if
private funds were used to make the rehabilitation
loans. Although our society is increasingly more
mobile, it is possible that a situation might arise
where contented homeowners would be forced to
sell their properties to repay a loan whose term has
expired. Even if this group is relatively small, such an
eventuality demands that some method of future
refinancing be explored to allow satisfied home-
owners to maintain home-ownership. The maximum
loan term issue, however, may only present a
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problem if private funds are used to make relnabilita-
tion loans. It Is entirely conceivable for tfiere to be no
maximum loan provision at all if CD funds alone are
used to mal<e the rehabilitation loans.
The second criticism of the loan scheme concerns
the efficacy of rehabilitation loan programs in
general. Programs fail as weW as succeed. With a
poorly conceived deferred payment loan program,
property owners might be left with large loans to
repay in neighborhoods which have long since gone
under. This possibility demands that planners
carefully assess marl<etconditionsand realities, and
cautiously select target communities. In some
deteriorated neighborhoods, it might make more
sense to do nothing than to cause a large in-
debtedness among community residents while not
substantially changing neighborhood conditions.
Low-Income Homeowners
other low-income homeowners in the CD area
would be eligible for the more traditional low-
interest installment type loans made available by
local lending institutions through the Housing
Authority. CD funds would be used to subsidize
interest rates down to 3%. The terms of these loans
would vary with structure type and need, with a
maximum term of fifteen years. The resulting
mortgages would provide the basic security for the
loan. Additionally, a Loan Guarantee Fund would be
established with CD money to further secure the
loans and to guarantee high risk loans made by the
lending institutions.
Figure 4
The Costs of Supporting
a Deferred Payment Loan
Assumptions
- Investor-owners obtains $5,000 rehabilita-
tion loan
Current monthly rent on property
Deferred Payment Loan
Amount needed to be deposited
each month to grow to $5,000
in 15 years; assuming 6%
monthly compounding
Approximate rent increase for
month to have enough money
at the end of the 15 years
to pay back the loan
Low-Interest Amortized Loan
Monthly mortgage payment on
5%, 15 year loan
Monthly rent increase needed
to support a 5%, 15 yr. loan
Marl<et Rate Loan
Monthly mortgage payment of a
9%, 15 year loan
Monthly rent increase needed
to support a 9%, 15 yr. loan
$57.00
$17.19
$18.00
$39.54
$40.00
$86.21
$87.00
Abandonment can be discouraged through reinvestment
assistance. pho,,, ^y eiair poiiock
Low-Income Investor-Owners
It is an accepted practice for the increased costs of
maintaining real estate to be passed on in the form of
higher rents. Providing rehabilitation assistance to
investor-owners of substandard units would in-
directly benefit low- and moderate-income tenants
by reducing the rent increases they would face. The
use of a deferred payment loan program would be
most effective in helping to accomplish this end.
Once again, either public or private funds could be
used to make loans of up to $5,000 to bring
properties up to code standards.
Investor-owners would be allowed to increase
their rents under the program. The granting of the
loan would, however, be conditioned on the rent
increases (due to the rehabilitation loan) being
limited to that amount which would grow to the
principal of the rehabilitation loan at the end of the
loan term, assuming that the additional rent was
deposited in an interest-bearing account at 6%. This
would give the investor-owner present enjoyment of
the rehabilitation work, and provide enough money
to repay the loan with the increased rents received
over the life of the loan term. More importantly, as
Figure 4 shows, the rent increase needed to support
adeferred payment loan issignificantly less than the
rent increase needed to support either a low-interest
or market rate amortized loan. This is because the
loans made to investor-owners are essentially in-
terest free, with the city subsidizing interest charges.
The idea behind an investor-owner deferred pay-
ment loan program is to try to create an attractive
rehabilitation program for investors, while keeping
rent increases as low as possible for tenants. Since
the cost of rehabilitating a property is the measure
used to determine subsequent increases in rent, a
successful reinvestment program must keep such
costs low. The deferred payment loan program
works well in accomplishing this by providing
interest-free loans to investor-owners and allowing
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Figure 5
Comparisons of Deferred Payment Loan and Amortized
Loan Programs for Investor-Owners for Term of 15 Years
Rate of Principal Monthly Pay- Total Interest
Interest rnent Needed Over 15 Yrs.
to Support Loan
5% net. $8,500.00 $29.23* $6,375.00
5% net. 7,000.00 24.07* 5,250.00
5% Def. 5,000.00 17.19* 3,750.00
5% net. 3,000.00 10.31' 2,250.00
5% Def. 1,000.00 3.43* 750.00
5% 8,500.00 67.21 3,597.80
5% 7,000.00 55.35 2,963.00
5% 5,000.00 39.54 2,117.20
5% 3,000.00 23.72 1,269.60
5% 1,000.00 7.90 422.00
9% 8,500.00 86.21 7,017.80
9% 7,000.00 71.00 5,780.00
9% 5,000.00 50.71 4,127.80
9% 3,000.00 30.43 2,477.40
9% 1,000.00 10.14 825.20
•Monthly payment which would grow to the value of the
rehabilitation loan in 15 Years assuming 6% I merest Rate,
Sinking fund factor—.003439.
repayment up to fifteen years later. Rent increases
are regulated to reflect this inexpensive means of
financing rehabilitation work.
The deferred payment loan program also
succeeds in encouraging investor-owner participa-
tion. As noted earlier, a substantial portion of the
substandard stock is owned by elderly landlords on
fixed incomes (Salamon 1977). Many of these
landlords would be interested in having more liquid
assets, as their age and economic circumstances
make it hard to keep up with the cost of living. Selling
their properties, however, would be somewhat dif-
ficult in the unfavorable investor climate. The
deferred payment loan program, though, can
provide investor-owners with a way of increasing net
cash flow. This is because they are given loans
which they repay in the future, while being able to
increase present rents as soon as the rehabilitation
work is complete. This gives investor-owners the
option of either enjoying the present benefits of the
increased rents or saving that money to repay the
loan in fifteen years. As Figure 3 indicates, a
successful reinvestment effort can greatly benefit
the investor-owner participating in a deferred pay-
ment loan program.
Other Investor-Owners
The deferred payment loan program offers sub-
stantial benefits for both the tenant and investor-
owner. However, because the program does provide
such substantial benefits to the investor-owner (a
person not often perceived as warranting aid), and
because of budgetary constraints, it makes sense
initially to limit the scope of a deferred payment loan
program to low-income investor-owners.
Other investor-owners would be given financial
assistance to rehabilitate their properties, but would
not receive as much a subsidy as low-income
investor-owners. A low-interest, amortized loan
program, where the investor-owner received up to
$5,000 to bring property up to code standards,
would be one good way to provide such assistance.
With the cooperation of the Housing Authority, the
CD office, and local lending institutions, loans could
be made available to investor-owners at ap-
proximately the same interest rate at which the
Housing Authority could borrow the funds. This
would allow investor-owners to rehabilitate their
properties without incurring as large a rehabilitation
debt as with a simple-interest market rate loan. For
example, the monthly mortgage payment on a
$5,000, fifteen year loan drops from $50.71 at a 9%
interest rate to $39.54 at a 5% interest rate.
Provisions could be incorporated into the program
to insure that such savings were passed on to the
tenants in the form of lower rents{see Figure 5).
The Section Eight Existing Housing
Program
Under almost any rehabilitation loan scheme,
investor-owners will be forced to increase rents to
offset the financing costs of a rehabilitation loan.
However, as noted previously, the rent increase
expected under a deferred payment loan scheme
should be much less than expected under a more
traditional loan program.
Nonetheless, methods to decrease tenant hard-
ships suffered from paying increased rents must be
actively sought if a rehabilitation program is to be
truly successful. This can be accomplished to a
certain degree by tying together the Section 8
Existing Program promulgated under the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974 with
neighborhood revitaiization programs.
Under the Section 8 program, eligible low-income
families can select a standard rental unit and pay
between 15% and 25% of their income toward the
rent. Although the housing unit must be within the
Fair Market levels set for the area, the federal
government will subsidize the difference between
25% of the renter's income and the rent on the
Section 8 unit (Mendelson and Quinn 1976, p. 221).
Cities like Durham might work out informal
arrangements to try to make Section 8 existing
housing payments available to tenants living in
rehabilitated rental properties to pay for the increase
in rent attributable to rehabilitation work.
The major problem with the Section 8 Existing
Program is that the need for housing subsidy
payments far outstrips the level of federal funding
provided (Meacher 1977). Durham and other
medium-sized cities in North Carolina might
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therefore try to establish priorities for the distribu-
tion of Section 8 allotted funds to provide financial
assistance to those tenants living in neighborhoods
undergoing a rehabilitation effort who will be facing
large increases in rent. Additionally, if tenants can
be encouraged to stay in rehabilitated units within
the neighborhood undergoing a revitalization effort,
the Section 8 program might be a further incentive
for investor-owners to undertake rehabilitation
work, since they will be more assured of having
tenants who can pay increased rents.
Critical Maintenance Program
One of the greatest challenges of a successful
neighborhood revitalization effort is not in the actual
rehabilitation phase itself, but in maintaining an area
once it has been rehabilitated. Many homeowners
are forced to postpone critical maintenance due to
the continuing expense represented by their loans.
This strategy addresses the maintenance problem
through the use of a critical maintenance project.
The proposed project in Durham, "Project
Perseverance," would have two elements, based on
a small allocation of CD funds made available to
each target neighborhood. One element would be a
"tool lending library" at neighborhood CD offices,
where residents would be able to check out tools to
do household improvements. Secondly, home-
owners in need of more complicated repairs would
be able to apply to the CD office for a partial critical
maintenance grant. A housing advisor in each target
area would coordinate a team of workers made up of
CETA-funded local residents, neighborhood and
other volunteers, and trade-school students to per-
form critical maintenance functions. Homeowners
would pay a percentage of the costs of the repair
work (depending on their income levels) in order to
encourage only normal wear and tear on the proper-
ty. This program is important because it would
provide an opportunity for neighborhood residents
to get involved with, and be paid for improving their
communities. Project Perseverance would be made
available to homeowners only, as investor-owners
can include maintenance costs in the rents they
charge.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to develop a housing
reinvestment strategy for improving the most
deteriorated housing conditions in the city of
Durham. Hopefully, its basic principles can be
modified and applied to other medium-sized
southern cities. This strategy includes strict code
enforcement, the provision of a variety of rehabilita-
tion loans to both homeowners and investor-owners
with emphasis on the deferred payment loan, the use
of Section 8 housing assistance payments, and the
implementation of a critical maintenance program.
The article attributed great importance to the need
for greater reliance to be placed on local resources
in addressing housing problems. It is only when the
different local actors affecting a community's viabili-
ty are reacquainted and begin to interact that normal
market mechanisms can function and neighbor-
hood conditions stabilize.
Although cities like Durham have major housing
problems, market conditions are significantly better
than in larger cities. Chances for making significant
impacts on substandard housing conditions should
therefore be greater in Durham and similarly
situated cities. Such cities, however, must sense the
immediacy of their housing problems. Intervention
is needed while cities are still in an advantageous
position to make positive impacts on substandard
housing. Unless financial and other incentives are
used to improve the quality of substandard housing
conditions, and to return them to economical viabili-
ty, these properties may lapse into even greater
deterioration, resulting in adverse community
effects.
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